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A Kernel-Oriented Algorithm for Transmission
Expansion Planning
Javier Contreras, Member, IEEE and Felix F. Wu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—With deregulation sweeping all over electrical
systems around the world, transmission planning has undergone
dramatic changes during this decade. Centralized cost allocation
methods have become obsolete and new procedures are needed
to deal with intelligent and self-sufficient players. In this paper
we study the allocation of transmission costs in a decentralized
manner. For this purpose we have developed a multi-agent
system that is based on a well known cooperative game theory
procedure, the kernel. Using our approach, the agents are able
to form kernel-stable coalitions and the cost allocation procedure
is performed at every step of the kernel- algorithm. A six bus
example and an IEEE 24 bus case illustrate our model.
Index Terms—Cooperative game theory, kernel, multi-agent sys-
tems, transmission planning.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRANSMISSION planning has been traditionally central-ized until deregulation has been adopted by different coun-
tries around the world.
Historically, a seminal work by Garver formulated the
transmission expansion problem in mathematical notation
in the early seventies [1]. During this decade, mixed-integer
programming techniques using Benders decomposition [2]–[4],
simulated annealing [5], genetic algorithms [6], and artificial
neural networks [7] are among the latest contributions to the
field.
However, in the new deregulated environment, new features
related to transmission expansion and also connected to trans-
mission pricing have been pointed out by several authors [8].
In particular, economies of scale and synergies in the expansion
may become crucial in decentralized planning models.
On the other hand, not only expansion plans but also fair
ways to split lines’ usage costs have been recently studied
[9]–[11]. The MW-mile method and other embedded cost
methods are currently under heavy modifications in order
to account for wheeling transactions among the users of the
network.
Game theory has also been used to model the sharing of costs
among the users of new transmission lines. Gately modeled a
centralized cooperative game theory framework where the in-
vestments were shared according to the Shapley values of the
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game of expansion [12]. However, this approach was not appli-
cable to an environment where the players take their decisions
looking for their own benefit only.
Distributed Artificial Intelligence has proved a valuable tool
to aid game theory coping with multi-agent decision systems
in decentralized environments. The combination of both tech-
niques has been already applied to solve transmission expansion
simple scenarios [13], [14]. The use of bilateral Shapley values
and a cost allocation technique based on a backward induction
method has been successful with simple examples.
This paper is an extension of the original transmission expan-
sion problem studied in [13] that explores a new methodology:
the kernel approach. The kernel is a concept from cooperative
game theory that splits a common resource among the players
in terms of the “strength” of the members of the coalition. In
particular, for the transmission expansion game, it rewards the
members that are less costly to the expansion of the system.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II covers
the mathematical model of the transmission planning problem.
Section III describes multi-agent settings and their connection
to game theory. Section IV analyzes the kernel approach and
the cost allocation procedure. Section V shows the results from
a 6 bus example and an IEEE 24 bus case. Finally, Section VI
draws several conclusions.
II. THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROBLEM
A simplified formulation of the transmission expansion






is the cost of adding line to the network,
is the active power (in p.u.) flowing through the added
line , i.e. the th element of , and
is the flow vector for the possible new lines.
is the number of possible new lines, is the matrix whose
elements are the imaginary parts of the nodal admittance matrix
of the existing network, is the phase angle vector, is the
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transpose of the node-branch connection matrix, is the nodal
injection power for the overall network, is a diagonal matrix
whose elements are the branch admittances, is the branch
active power vector, and is the network incidence matrix.
III. MULTI-AGENT SETTING AND GAME THEORY
The main advantage of a centralized planning system is its
simplicity. Using a central planner, we do not need a synchro-
nized algorithm to exchange information amongst coordinator
and agents, neither among the agents themselves. A multi-agent
system with decentralized decision making is a more complex
system. Then, why using such a complex system?
In real life, an agent is just an autonomous entity that makes
decisions according to her own intelligence and also depending
on the actions of other players. A system with many autonomous
decision makers is called a multi-agent system. In transmission
planning, there are many agents or players that can make deci-
sion about expanding the network or not. In particular, gener-
ators, loads and transmission line owners. It is not easy to de-
termine how these agents can obtain the maximum individual
benefit from expanding the line, and if it is better or not to form
coalitions to gain more.
To solve this problem, this paper proposes a multi-agent
system that is driven by coalitional agreements based on
cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory is a branch
of game theory that deals with players that are willing to join
other players in order to obtain more benefit. Indeed this is the
case of transmission planning, where bigger coalitions need
less lines to expand the network, since the overall reliability is
improved if there are more players. However, this decentralized
and distributed decision making process needs a coordinator to
ensure that the flow of information is synchronized. The next
section presents the mathematical formulation that the agents
use to build coalitions, based on a solution formula called the
kernel, within a multi-agent framework.
IV. COALITION FORMATION AND COST ALLOCATION: A
KERNEL APPROACH
The kernel [16] is a cooperative game theory solution concept
in which the coalitional configurations are stable in the sense
that there is an equilibrium between pairs of individual agents
which are in the same coalition. Two agents , in a coalition
are in equilibrium if they cannot outweight one another from
, their common coalition. Agent can outweight if is
stronger than , where strength refers to the potential of agent
to successfully claim a part of the payoff of agent .
In each stage of the coalition formation process, the agents are
in a coalitional configuration. That is, the agents are arranged in
a set of coalitions . During the coalition formation
process agents can use the kernel solution concept to object to
the payoff distribution that is attached to their coalitional con-
figuration. The objections that agents can make are based on the
excess concept. The relevant definitions are recalled now.
Excess: The excess1 of a coalition with respect to a coali-
tional configuration is defined as
(4)
where is the payoff of agent and is the coalitional
value of coalition . The number of excesses is an important
property of the kernel solution concept. Agents use the excesses
as a measure of their relative strengths. Since a higher excess
correlates with more strength, rational agents must search for
the highest excess they have. The maximum is defined by the
surplus.
Surplus and Outweight: The maximum surplus of
agent A over agent B with respect to a coalitional configuration
is defined by
(5)
where are the excesses of all the coalitions that include
and exclude , and the coalitions are not in the current coali-
tional configuration. Agent outweights agent if
and , where is the coalitional value of
agent in a single agent coalition.
The agents compare their maximum surpluses, and the one
with the larger maximum surplus is stronger. The stronger agent
can claim a part of the weaker agent’s payoff, but this claim is
limited by the individual rationality: . Therefore,
agent cannot claim an amount that would leave agent with
or less. If two agents cannot outweight one another, they
are in equilibrium: and are in equilibrium if one of the
following conditions is satisfied: 1. ; 2.
and ; 3. and .
Note that equilibrium is defined only for pairs of distinct
agents who are members of the same coalition.
Using the concept of equilibrium, the kernel can be defined as
the set of all coalitional configurations (and its associated pay-
offs) such that every pair of agents within the same coalition are
in equilibrium. A coalitional configuration (and payoff distribu-
tion) of this type is also called kernel stable (K-stable). Further-
more, the kernel always exists for any coalitional configuration.
However, checking the stability does not direct the agents to a
specific coalitional configuration. The following example from
[17] illustrates a simple kernel configuration.
Consider a game given by the characteristic functions
(the payoff that agents or coalitions or agents can obtain by
themselves):
where there are three players: , and , and is the grand
coalition formed by all three of them. Suppose players and
are considering their coalition such that their payoff configura-
tion is:
1See [16] for details.
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where is the payoff of each player and the coalition config-
uration. There are two coalitions that include but exclude ,
namely coalitions and . The excess of coalition A with re-
spect to is , while the excess
of coalition is .
The maximum surplus of player over player is therefore
. Similarly, . Since
and , player outweights player
with respect to and the payoff configuration is not in
the kernel of the game.
Now consider another payoff configuration for the same
game, this time one with the grand coalition, or
The maximum surplus of player over player is
The converse maximum surplus is . Since
and , player outweights player with respect to
, and the payoff configuration is not in the kernel. But
consider now the payoff configuration
Here, we find that .
Therefore, all players are in equilibrium, and the payoff config-
uration is a point of the kernel.
In the transmission planning problem considered as a coop-
erative game, the steps that are taken to build coalitions and to
allocate costs are based on the Kernel-oriented Coalition Algo-
rithm (KCA) developed by Klusch and Shehory [18], [19]. This
is a new formulation of the same problem as seen in [14] where
a Bilateral Shapley Value (BSV) algorithm was presented.
As said above, the KCA is a decentralized, negotiation-ori-
ented coalition algorithm which determines a kernel-stable pay-
ment. The coalition negotiation is round-based, which means
that all agents are synchronized at specified points in the nego-
tiations. At the end of each round a new coalition is formed out
of two old coalitions or there are no accepted coalition proposals
and the algorithm stops with a kernel-stable payment configu-
ration. For more details on how the agents are defined at the
beginning of the game see [14].
Each round of the KCA can be divided in three phases:
A. Calculating and Sending Coalition Offers
Initially, all players are single coalitions. The coalition
chooses the strongest (in the kernel sense) representative to
calculate coalition offers. Her task is to calculate the new payoff
vector of every joint coalition that may be possible to create.
Then, a K-stable payment configuration is calculated for each
coalition structure that can be formed out of the old structure by
joining the own coalition with one in the ranking list. Later, the
representative sends a proposal to every promising coalition.
Fig. 1. 6 bus Garver test system.
B. Coalition Formation
If the payment to all members of the joint coalition is greater
than their current payoffs in their original coalitions, and if the
received offer is the first in the ranking list, then the proposal
is accepted. This local decision is broadcasted to all current
coalitions.
C. Cost Allocation and Stopping Rules
Cost are allocated at every iteration using the K-stable con-
cept, and when the coalition formation process ends, the al-
located cost is the last one calculated. Negotiation continues
until all proposals of all coalition entities of the current coali-
tion structure are rejected, or a grand coalition has been already
formed, or a pre-defined time period has been exceeded.
V. NUMERICAL TESTS
To test the KCA model we have run simulations with two dif-
ferent transmission expansion planning examples. A dual soft-
ware platform has been implemented with that purpose. The
first component simulates the coalition formation process and
the second one the cost allocation procedure. The software im-
plementation is shown in great detail in [20], [21].
A. 6 Bus Garver Test System KCA Solution
The first example is the classical 6 bus example from Garver
[1], as shown in Fig. 1. Cost data and coalitional values are pre-
sented in Tables I and II, respectively. Note that the costs are
equivalent to negative values in Table II.
The kernel algorithm rewards strong agents from the begin-
ning, and this is the case of agent 6. Bus 6 is constantly needed
to supply the load for most of the other buses and it is rewarded
by the kernel method because agent 6 excesses with respect to
possible coalition partners are high.
Following the kernel-stable algorithm formulated above, the
coalition formation process is as follows: [1, {2-6}, 3, 4, 5]
[{1-2-6}, 3, 4, 5] [{1-2-4-6}, 3, 5] [{1-2-3-4-6}, 5]
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TABLE I
6 BUS GARVER TEST SYSTEM DATA
TABLE II
COALITION EXPANSION VALUES FOR THE 6 BUS SYSTEM
[{1-2-3-4-5-6}]. The final cost allocation is: (16.25, 76.25,
16.25, 60, 40, 13.75).
B. 6 Bus Garver Test System BSV Solution
Previous work based on Bilateral Shapley Values [13],
[14] showed several possible grand coalition cost alloca-
tion solutions:
From Table III, it is observable that the BSV method does not
favor big players as much as the kernel. More fairness in the cost
allocation can be expected from BSV’s, acting in a Shapley-like
fashion. This fact is observed in the allocation of cost to buses
4, 5 and 6, where Table III shows that bus 6 must always pay in
contrast to the kernel solution where the other agents subsidize
bus 6 (the strongest) increasing their own payments.
C. 6 Bus Garver Test System Sunk Costs Allocation
A variation of the six bus example is the cost allocation of
all lines: existing and possible new ones, assuming a total ex-
pansion cost of 130 monetary units, the grand coalition scheme.
Table IV shows the new costs. Kernel allocation results are as
follows: (0, 90, 0, 60, 40, 0). The simulation shows that
only buses 2 and 6 form a coalition and the process ends after
1 step. The reason is that sunk costs exceed the cost limits that
TABLE III
6 BUS BILATERAL SHAPLEY VALUE ALGORITHM RESULTS
TABLE IV
SUNK COSTS FOR THE 6 BUS GARVER TEST SYSTEM
make buses attractive to possible partners. Therefore, sunk costs
cannot be calculated using the algorithm proposed in Section IV.
BSV’s would lead to similar conclusions.
D. IEEE 24 Bus RTS Example
The final example is taken from the IEEE 24 bus Reliability
Test System (RTS), as shown in Fig. 2 and Tables V–VII. Note
that Fig. 2 presents the IEEE 24 bus system divided in four ini-
tial coalitions that fulfill the self-sufficiency axioms described
in [14]. Table V shows the possible new lines in shadowed grey
color and total generation ( ) and demand ( ) for each coali-
tion are also shown in Fig. 2. It is also assumed that line thermal
limits are equal to 3333 MW for all lines.
The KCA produces the coalition formation process and final
cost allocation as presented in Fig. 3.
These results indicate that self-sufficient players, like coali-
tion 4, with no need to expand their own system, will benefit
from other player’s gradual expansion plans. In particular, total
system reliability is greatly enhanced with player 4 and that is
why player 4 gets a positive reward whilst players 1, 2, and 3
have to pay for expansion, although much less than in isolation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown a new decentralized coalition formation
and cost allocation procedure based on a kernel approach.
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Fig. 2. IEEE 24 bus RTS example.
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TABLE V
IEEE 24 BUS RTS LINE CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE VI
IEEE 24 BUS RTS NODE CHARACTERISTICS
It has been tested with a simple 6 bus problem and a more real-
istic IEEE 24 bus RTS example with good results. However, the
procedure has not solved the allocation of sunk costs; it will be
subject of further research.
The main advantages of the KCA approach have been:
• Higher rewards to stronger players as compared to a BSV
approach: agents that do not need to build new lines are
always benefitted.
TABLE VII
VALUES FOR THE IEEE 24 BUS RTS EXAMPLE
Fig. 3. IEEE 24 bus RTS example KCA results.
• Uniqueness of the solution to the transmission expansion
problem, in contrast to a BSV approach.
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